Abstract. We present the first fully secure Identity-Based Encryption scheme (IBE) from the standard assumptions where the security loss depends only on the security parameter and is independent of the number of secret key queries. This partially answers an open problem posed by Waters (Eurocrypt 2005). Our construction combines the Waters' dual system encryption methodology (Crypto 2009) with the Naor-Reingold pseudo-random function (J. ACM, 2004) in a novel way. The security of our scheme relies on the DLIN assumption in prime-order groups. Along the way, we introduce a novel notion of dual system groups and a new randomization and parameter-hiding technique for prime-order bilinear groups.
Introduction
In an Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) scheme [27] , encryption requires only the identity of the recipient (e.g. an email address or an IP address) and a set of global public parameters, thus eliminating the need to distribute a separate public key for each user in the system. The first realizations of IBE were given in 2001; the security of these schemes were based on either Bilinear Diffie-Hellman or QR in the random oracle model [7, 13] . Since then, tremendous progress has been made towards obtaining IBE and HIBE schemes that are secure in the standard model based on pairings [8, 5, 6, 28, 15, 29] as well as lattices [16, 9, 2, 3] . Specifically, starting with [29] , we now have very efficient constructions of IBE based on standard assumptions which achieve the strongest security notion of full (adaptive) security, where the adversary may choose the challenge identity after seeing both the public parameters and making key queries.
In this work, we focus on the issue of security reduction and security loss in the construction of fully secure IBE. Consider an IBE scheme with a security reduction showing that attacking the scheme in time t with success probability ϵ implies breaking some conjectured hard problem in time roughly t with success probability ϵ/L; we refer to L as the security loss, and a tight reduction is one where L is a constant. All known constructions of fully secure IBE schemes from standard assumptions incur a security loss that is at least linear in the number of key queries q; the only exceptions are constructions in the random oracle model [7] and those based on q-type assumptions [15] . Motivated by this phenomenon, Waters [28] posed the following problem in 2005 (reiterated in [15, 4] ):
" Design an IBE with a tight security reduction to a standard assumption. "
That is, we are interested in constructions based on "static" assumptions like the Decisional Linear (DLIN) assumption or the subgroup decisional assumption and which do not rely on random oracles. Note that an IBE with a tight security reduction would also imply signatures with a tight security reduction via the Naor's transformation [7] ; indeed, the latter were the focus in a series of very recent works [1, 19, 17] .
We stress that tight reductions are not just theoretical issues for IBE, rather they are of utmost practical importance: as L increases, we need to increase the size of the underlying groups in order to compensate for the security loss, which in turn increases the running time of the implementation. Note that the impact on performance is quite substantial, as exponentiation in a r-bit group takes time roughly O(r 3 ). While the ultimate goal is to achieve constant security loss (i.e. L = O(1)), even achieving L = poly(λ) and independent of q is already of both practical and theoretical interest. For typical settings of parameters (e.g. λ = 128 and q = 2 20 ), λ is much smaller than q. From the theoretical stand-point, we currently have two main techniques for obtaining fully secure IBE from standard assumptions: random partitioning [28] and dual system encryption framework [29] . For the former, we now know that an Ω(q) security loss is in fact inherent [18] . For the latter, all known instantiations also incur an Ω(q) security loss; an interesting theoretical question is whether this is in fact inherent to the dual system encryption framework.
Our results
Our main result is an IBE scheme based on the d-LIN assumption with security loss O(λ) for λ-bit identities: We compare our scheme with prior constructions in Figure 1 . Applying the Naor transform, we also obtain a d-LIN-based signature scheme with constant-size signatures and security loss independent of the number of signature queries. This yields an alternative construction for an analogous result in [17] .
Reference |MPK| security loss additive overhead assumption
Comparison amongst IBE schemes, where {0, 1} n is the identity space, q is the number of adversary's key queries, and ϵ is the adversary's advantage. In all of these constructions, |SK| = |CT| = O(1).
Our approach. The inspiration for our construction comes from a recent connection between predicate encryption and one-time symmetric-key primitives [30] -namely one-time MACs in the case of IBE -via dual system encryption [29] . Our key observation is to extend this connection to "reusable MACs", namely that if we start with an appropriate pseudorandom function (PRF) with security loss L, we may derive an IBE with the security loss O(L). More concretely, we begin with the Naor-Reingold DDH-based PRF [24] which has security loss n for input domain {0, 1}
n , and obtain a fully secure IBE with security loss O(n) via a novel variant of the dual system encryption methodology. Our IBE scheme is essentially that obtained by embedding Waters' fully secure IBE based on DBDH [28] into composite-order groups, and then converting this to a prime-order scheme following [10, 25, 20, 14] (along with some new technical ideas). Here, we exploit the fact that the Waters' IBE and the Naor-Reingold PRF share a similar algebraic structure based on bit-by-bit encoding of the identity and PRF input respectively.
Technical overview
We provide a more technical overview of our main results, starting with the proof idea and then the construction. Here, we assume some familiarity with prior works.
Proof idea. Our security proof combines Waters' dual system encryption methodology [29] with ideas from the analysis of the Naor-Reingold PRF. In a dual system encryption scheme [29] , there are two types of keys and ciphertexts: normal and semi-functional. A key will decrypt a ciphertext properly unless both the key and the ciphertext are semi-functional, in which case decryption will fail with overwhelming probability. The normal keys and ciphertexts are used in the real system, and keys are gradually introduced in the hybrid security proof, one at a time. Ultimately, we arrive at a security game in which the simulator only has to produce semi-functional objects and security can be proved directly. In all prior instantiations of this methodology, the semifunctional keys are introduced one at a time. As a result, we require q hybrid games to switch all of the keys from normal to semi-functional, leading to an Ω(q) security loss, since each step requires a computational assumption.
We deviate from the prior paradigm by using only n hybrid games, iterating over the bits in the bit-by-bit encoding of the identity, as was done in the Naor-Reingold PRF. That is, we introduce n types of semi-functional ciphertexts and keys, where type i objects appear in game i, while gradually increasing the entropy in the semi-functional components in each game. This strategy introduces new challenges specific to the IBE setting, namely that the adversary could potentially use the challenge ciphertext to test whether we have switched from type i − 1 keys to type i keys. Prior works exploit the fact that we only switch a single key in each step, whereas we could be switching up to q keys in each step.
We overcome this difficulty as follows. At step i of the hybrid game, we guess the i'th bit b i of the challenge identity ID * , and abort if our guess is incorrect. This results in a security loss of 2, which we can afford. If our guess b i is correct, -for all identities whose i'th bit equals b i , the corresponding type i − 1 and type i object are the same;
-for all other identities, we increase the entropy of the keys going from type i − 1 to type i (via a tight reduction to a computational assumption). . This is again different from prior instantiations of the dual system encryption methodology where decryption fails for semi-functional objects.
In the final transition, a semi-functional type n object for identity ID has semifunctional component R n (ID) where R n is a truly random function. In particular, the semi-functional ciphertext has semi-functional component R n (ID * ). Moreover, R n (ID * ) is truly random from the adversary's view-point because it only learns SK ID and thus R n (ID) for ID ̸ = ID * . We can then argue that the message which is masked by R n (ID * ) is information-theoretically hidden.
Construction. To achieve a modular analysis, we introduce a novel notion of nested dual system groups (see Section 3.1 for an overview). Our construction proceeds into two steps: the first builds an (almost) tight IBE from nested dual system groups where we rely on the Naor-Reingold PRF argument and the dual system encryption methodology; the second builds nested dual system groups from d-LIN where we handle all of the intricate linear algebra associated with simulating composite-order groups in prime-order groups from [10, 20] and with achieving a tight reduction via random self-reducibility.
Perspective. In spite of the practical motivation for tight security reductions, we clarify that our contributions are largely of theoretical and conceptual interest. This is because any gain in efficiency from using smaller groups is overwhelmed by the loss from the bit-by-bit encoding of identities. Our work raises the following open problems:
-Can we reduce the size of the public parameters to a constant?
-Can we achieve tight security, namely L = O(1)?
We note that progress on either problem would likely require improving on the NaorReingold PRF: namely, reducing respectively the seed length and the security loss to a constant, both of which are long-standing open problems. We also note that the present blow-up in public parameters and security loss arise only in using the Naor-Reingold approach to build an IBE from nested dual system groups; our instantiation of nested dual system groups do achieve tight security.
Additional results
As a pre-cursor to nested dual system groups, we introduce a basic notion of dual system groups. We present -a generic construction of compact HIBE from dual system groups similar to the Lewko-Waters scheme over composite-order groups [22] ; and -instantiations of dual system groups under the d-LIN assumption in primeorder bilinear groups and the subgroup decisional assumption in composite-order bilinear groups respectively. Along the way, we provide a new randomization and parameter-hiding technique for prime-order groups.
Putting the two together, we obtain a new construction of compact HIBE in primeorder groups, as well as new insights into the structural properties needed for Waters' dual system encryption methodology [29] . We proceed to present an overview of dual system groups, our new techniques for prime-order groups and then an overview of nested dual system groups.
Dual system groups. Informally, dual system groups contain a triple of groups (G, H, G T ) and a non-generate bilinear map e : G × H → G T . For concreteness, we may think of (G, H, G T ) as composite-order bilinear groups. Dual system groups take as input a parameter 1 n (think of n as the depth of the HIBE) and satisfy the following properties:
(subgroup indistinguishability.) There are two computationally indistinguishable ways to sample correlated (n + 1)-tuples from G n+1 : the "normal" distribution, and a higher-entropy distribution with "semi-functional components". An analogous statement holds for H n+1 .
drawn from the respective normal distributions, we have that for all i = 1, . . . , n,
(parameter-hiding.) Both normal distributions can be efficiently sampled given the public parameters; on the other hand, given only the public parameters, the higherentropy distributions contain n "units" of information-theoretic entropy (in the semi-functional component), one unit for each of the n elements in the (n + 1)-tuple apart from the first.
The key novelty in the framework lies in identifying the role of associativity in the prior instantiations of the dual system encryption methodology in composite-order groups [22] .
Instantiation in prime-order groups. We present a new randomization and parameterhiding technique for prime-order bilinear groups, which we use to instantiate dual system groups. This technique allows us to hide arbitrarily large amounts of entropy while working with a vector space of constant dimensions, whereas prior works require a linear blow-up in dimensions.
To motivate the new technique, we begin with a review of composite-order bilinear groups. Let (G N , G T ) denote a composite-order bilinear group of order N = p 1 p 2 which is the product of two primes, endowed with an efficient bilinear map e :
A useful property of compositeorder groups, especially in the context of dual system encryption [22, 23] , is that we can perform randomization by raising a group element to the power of a random exponent a ← R Z N . This operation satisfy the following useful properties:
(parameter-hiding.) given g, g a , the quantity a (mod p 2 ) is completely hidden;
We show how to achieve randomization in the prime-order setting under the d-LIN assumption. Fix a prime-order bilinear group (G, G T ) of order p, endowed with an efficient bilinear map e :
Elements in G N correspond to elements in G d+1 and we consider the bilinear map e :
x ⊤ y . Following [25, 14] , we pick a random pair of orthogonal basis (B,
* is the identity matrix. We consider the projection maps π L , π R that map a (d + 1) × (d + 1) matrix to the left d columns and right-most column; they correspond to projecting a ∈ Z N to a (mod p 1 ) and a (mod p 2 ) respectively.
We randomize a basis (B, B * ) as follows: pick a random
and replace (B, B * ) with (BA, B * A ⊤ ). Observe that this transformation satisfy the following properties similar to those in the composite-order setting:
, the bottom-right entry of A is completely hidden;
where
We also establish a subspace indistinguishability assumption similar to those in prior works [26, 20, 12] .
Nested dual system groups. In nested dual system groups, we require a so-called nested-hiding property. Roughly speaking, this property says that it is computationally infeasible to distinguish q samples from some distribution with another; specifically, it allows us to boost the entropy of the semi-functional components. In the instantiation, we will need to establish this property with a tight reduction to some standard assumption. The nested-hiding property allows us to "embed" the Naor-Reingold analysis into the semi-functional space of a dual system encryption scheme. We stress that the nested-hiding property even for q = 1 is qualitatively different from right subgroup indistinguishability in dual system groups. We outline the instantiations of dual system groups in the composite-order and prime-order settings:
-The composite-order instantiation is very similar to that as before. We rely on composite-order group whose order is the product of three primes p 1 , p 2 , p 3 . The subgroup G p1 of order p 1 serves as the "normal space" and G p2 of order p 2 serves as the "semi-functional space". We also require a new static, generically secure assumption, which roughly speaking, states that DDH is hard in the G p2 subgroup. Here, we extend the techniques from [24] to establish nested-hiding indistinguishability without losing a factor of q in the security reduction. Our IBE analysis may also be viewed as instantiating the Naor-Reingold PRF in the G p2 subgroup.
-For the prime-order instantiation based on d-LIN, we extend the prior instantiation in several ways. First, we work with 2d × 2d matrices instead of (d + 1) × (d + 1) matrices. In both constructions, the first d dimensions serve as the "normal space"; in our construction, we require a d-dimensional semi-functional space instead of a 1-dimensional one so that we may embed the d-LIN assumption into the semifunctional space. Next, we extend the techniques from [24, 21] to establish nestedhiding indistinguishability without losing a factor of q in the security reduction.
Perspective. In developing the framework for dual system groups, we opted to identify the minimal properties needed for the application to dual system encryption in the most basic setting of (H)IBE; we adopted an analogous approach also for nested dual system groups. An alternative approach would have been to maximize the properties satisfied by both the composite-order and prime-order instantiations, with the hope of capturing a larger range of applications. In choosing the minimalist approach, we believe we can gain better insights into how and why dual system encryption works, as well as guide potential lattice-based instantiations. In addition, we wanted the framework to be as concise as possible and the instantiations to be as simple as possible. Nonetheless, the framework remains fairly involved and we hope to see further simplifications in future work.
Organization. We present nested dual system groups in Section 3, our IBE scheme in Section 4 and a self-contained description of our d-LIN-based scheme in Appendix A. For completeness, we included a formal description of dual system group in Appendix B. We defer all other details to the full versions of this paper [11, 10] .
Preliminaries
Notation. We denote by s ← R S the fact that s is picked uniformly at random from a finite set S and by x, y, z ← R S that all x, y, z are picked independently and uniformly at random from S. By PPT, we denote a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. Throughout, we use 1 λ as the security parameter. We use · to denote multiplication (or group operation) as well as component-wise multiplication. We use lower case boldface to denote (column) vectors over scalars or group elements and upper case boldface to denote vectors of group elements as well as matrices.
Identity-Based Encryption. An IBE scheme consists of four algorithms (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec): Guess. The adversary A must output a guess β ′ for β. 
Nested Dual System Groups
In this section, we present nested dual system groups, a variant of dual system groups with a notable difference: we require (computational) nested-hiding indistinguishability, in place of (computational) right subgroup indistinguishability and (informationtheoretic) parameter-hiding. As noted in the introduction, the nested-hiding property even for q = 1 is qualitatively different from right subgroup indistinguishability in dual system groups.
Overview
Informally, nested dual system groups contain a triple of groups (G, H, G T ) and a nongenerate bilinear map e : G × H → G T . For concreteness, we may think of (G, H, G T ) as composite-order bilinear groups. Nested dual system groups take as input a parameter 1 n and satisfy the following properties:
(left subgroup G.) There are two computationally indistinguishable ways to sample correlated (n + 1)-tuples from G n+1 : the "normal" distribution, and a higherentropy distribution with "semi-functional components". We sample the normal distribution using SampG and the semi-functional components using SampG.
(right subgroup H.) There is a single algorithm SampH to sample correlated (n + 1)-tuples from H n+1 . We should think of these tuples as already having semifunctional components, generated by some distinguished element h * ∈ H. It is convenient to think of h * as being orthogonal to each component in the normal distribution over G (c.f. orthogonality and Remark 1). On the other hand, we require that h * is not orthogonal to the semi-functional components in G (c.f. non-degeneracy) in order to information-theoretically hide the message in the final transition.
(nested-hiding.) We require a computational assumption over H which we refer to as nested-hiding, namely that for each i = 1, . . . , n,
are computationally indistinguishable, where (h 0 , h 1 , . . . , h n ) is sampled using SampH and γ is a random exponent. In the formal definition, we provide the adversary with q samples from these distributions, and in the instantiations, we provide a tight reduction (independent of q) to a static assumption such as DLIN.
sampled using SampG and SampH respectively, we have that for all i = 1, . . . , n,
We require this property for correctness.
Definitions
Syntax. Nested dual system groups consist of five randomized algorithms given by (SampP, SampGT, SampG, SampH) along with SampG:
, output public and secret parameters (PP, SP), where:
-PP contains a triple of groups (G, H, G T ) and a non-generate bilinear map e : G × H → G T , a linear map µ defined on H, along with some additional parameters used by SampG, SampH;
-given PP, we know ord(H) (i.e. the order of the group, which is independent of n) and can uniformly sample from H;
-SP contains h * ∈ H (where h * ̸ = 1), along with some additional parameters used by SampG;
SampGT : Im(µ) → G T . (As a concrete example, suppose µ : H → G T and Im(µ) = G T .)
The first four algorithms are used in the actual scheme, whereas the last algorithm is used only in the proof of security. We define SampG 0 to denote the first group element in the output of SampG, and we define SampG 0 analogously.
Correctness. The requirements for correctness are as follows: (projective.) For all h ∈ H and all coin tosses s, we have SampGT(µ(h); s) = e(SampG 0 (PP; s), h).
(associative.) For all
and for all i = 1, . . . , n, we have e(g 0 , h i ) = e(g i , h 0 ).
Security. The requirements for security are as follows (we defer a discussion to the end of this section):
(non-degeneracy.) With probability 1 − 2 −Ω(λ) overĝ 0 ← SampG 0 (PP, SP), we have that e(ĝ 0 , h * ) α is identically distributed to the uniform distribution over G T , where α ← R Z ord(H) .
(H-subgroup.) The output distribution of SampH(PP) is the uniform distribution over a subgroup of H n+1 .
(left subgroup indistinguishability.) For any adversary A, we define the advantage function:
For any g = (g 0 , . . . , g n ) ∈ G n+1 , and any i ∈ [n], we use g −i to denote  (g 0 , . . . , g i−1 , g i+1 , . . . , g n ) ∈ G n .
(nested-hiding indistinguishability.) For any adversary A, we define the advantage function:
Discussion. We provide additional justification and discussion on the preceding security properties.
Remark 1 (orthogonality). We may deduce from µ(h
Thus, we have e(g 0 , h * ) = e(g 0 , 1) = 1. For the instantiation from composite-order groups, h * is orthogonal to each element in the output of SampG, that is,
On the other hand, for the instantiation from prime-order groups, h * is in general not orthogonal to g 1 , . . . , g n .
Remark 2 (H-subgroup).
We rely on H-subgroup to re-randomize the secret keys in the proof of security for queries that share the same i-bit prefix; see Section 4.4 case 3.
Remark 3 (indistinguishability).
Observe that in left subgroup indistinguishability, the distinguisher does not get h * ; otherwise, it is possible to distinguish between the two distributions using orthogonality. It is also crucial that for nested-hiding, the distinguisher getsĝ −i and notĝ := (ĝ 0 ,ĝ 1 , . . . ,ĝ n ). (Looking ahead to the proof in Section 4.4, not havingĝ means that the simulator cannot generate ciphertexts to distinguish between Type i−1 and Type i secret keys.) Otherwise, givenĝ i , it is possible to distinguish between h j and h ′j by using the relation:
This relation follows from associative and left subgroup indistinguishability.
(Almost) Tight IBE from Nested Dual System Groups
We provide a construction of an IBE scheme from nested dual system groups where the ciphertext comprises two group elements in G and one in G T .
Overview. We begin with an informal overview of the scheme. Fix a bilinear group with a pairing e : G × G → G T . The starting point of our scheme is the following variant of Waters' IBE [28] with identity space {0, 1} n :
Note that MPK contains 2n + 1 group elements in G, which we will generate using SampP(1 λ , 1 2n ). We will use SampG(PP) to generate the terms (g s , u 
Construction
Let {0, 1} n be the identity space.
-Setup(1 λ , 1 n ): On input length parameter 1 n , first sample
Pick MSK ← R H and output the master public and secret key pair MPK := ( PP, µ(MSK) ) and MSK.
-Enc(MPK, x, m): On input an identity x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ {0, 1} n and m ∈ G T , sample
-KeyGen(MPK, MSK, y): On input an identity y ∈ {0, 1} n , sample
and output
and recover the message as
where the last equality relies on associative, namely, e(g 0 , h 2i−xi ) = e(g 2i−xi , h 0 ). In addition, by projective, we have g ′ T = e(g 0 , MSK). Correctness follows readily.
Proof of Security
We prove the following theorem: 
where poly(λ, n) is independent of Time(A).
Remark 4.
In our instantiations of nested dual system groups, the quantity Adv NS B2 (λ, q) will be related to the advantage function corresponding to some static assumption, with a constant overhead independent of q. Putting the two together, this means that Adv IBE A (λ) is independent of q, as stated in Theorem 1. The proof follows via a series of games, summarized in Figure 3 . To describe the games, we must first define semi-functional keys and ciphertexts. Following [10, 30] , we first define two auxiliary algorithms, and define the semi-functional distributions via these auxiliary algorithms.
Auxiliary algorithms. We consider the following algorithms:
′ ∈ H, and t := (T 0 , T 1 , . . . , T 2n ) ∈ G 2n+1 , output
Auxiliary distributions. For i = 0, 1, . . . , n, we pick a random function R i : {0, 1} i → ⟨h * ⟩ (we use {0, 1} 0 to denote the singleton set containing just the empty string ε). More concretely, given (PP, h * ), we sample the function R i by first choosing a random function R ′ i : {0, 1} i → Z ord(H) (via lazy sampling), and define
Pseudo-normal ciphertext.
where g ← SampG(PP) andĝ ← SampG(PP, SP) ; we can also write this distribution more explicitly as
Semi-functional ciphertext type i (for
where g ← SampG(PP) andĝ ← SampG(PP, SP) and x| i denotes the i-bit prefix of x; we can also write this distribution more explicitly as
Semi-functional secret key type i (for i = 0, 1, . . . , n). Fig. 3 . Sequence of games, where we drew a box to highlight the differences between each game and the preceding one, a dash (-) means the same as in the previous game. Recall that Ri : {0, 1} i → ⟨h * ⟩ is a random function. Here, the product Π denotes Π n k=1 . We transition from Game0 to Game1 and from Game2,i−1 to Game2,i using a computational argument via left subgroup and nested-hiding respectively; for the remaining transitions, we use a statistical argument via orthogonality and non-degeneracy.
where a fresh h ← SampH(PP) is chosen for each secret key; we can also write this distribution more explicitly as
Remark 5 (decryption capabilities).
As noted in the introduction, decryption capabilities remain the same through the hybrid games. Observe that a type i secret key for x * can decrypt a type i ciphertext for x * since they share R i (x * | i ). In addition, a type i secret key for x * can decrypt a normal ciphertext for x * because e(g 0 , R i (x * | i )) = 1, which follows readily from R i (x * | i ) ∈ ⟨h * ⟩ and e(g 0 , h * ) = 1 (see Remark 1).
Game sequence. We present a series of games. We write Adv xx (λ) to denote the advantage of A in Game xx .
-Game 0 : is the real security game (c.f. Section 2).
-Game 1 : is the same as Game 0 except that the challenge ciphertext is pseudonormal.
-Game 2,i for i from 0 to n, Game 2,i is the same as Game 1 except that the challenge ciphertext and all secret keys are of type i.
-Game 3 : is the same as Game 2,n , except that the challenge ciphertext is a semifunctional encryption of a random message in G T .
In Game 3 , the view of the adversary is statistically independent of the challenge bit β. Hence, Adv 3 (λ) = 0. We complete the proof by establishing the following sequence of lemmas. Observe that when t = g, CT x * is properly distributed as Enc(MPK, x * , m β ) from projective, the output is identical to that in Game 0 ; and when t = g ·ĝ, the output is identical to that in Game 1 . We may therefore conclude that:
⊓ ⊔ Lemma 2 (Game 1 to Game 2,0 ). For any adversary A,
Proof. Observe that MSK and MSK · R 0 (ε) (where MSK ← R H) are identically distributed, so we may replace MSK in Game 1 by MSK·R 0 (ε). The resulting distribution is identically distributed to that in Game 2,0 except we use µ(MSK · R 0 (ε)) instead of µ(MSK) in MPK. Now, by orthogonality, these two quantities are in fact equal. ⊓ ⊔
Type i − 1 to Type i
We begin with an informal overview of our proof strategy. For simplicity, suppose the adversary only requests secret keys for two identities y 0 and y 1 that differ only in the i'th bit, that is,
. . , y n ) and y 1 = (y 1 , . . . , y i−1 , 1 , y i+1 , . . . , y n )
Recall that Type i − 1 secret keys for y 0 and y 1 are of the form:
) and
whereas Type i secret keys for y 0 and y 1 are of the form:
In order to show that Type i − 1 and Type i secret keys for y 0 and y 1 are indistinguishable, it suffices to show that
are computationally indistinguishable (*). Now, suppose for simplicity that the i'th bit of the identity x * for challenge ciphertext is 1. Then, nested-hiding indistinguishability with index 2i tells us that
are computationally indistinguishable, where γ ← R Z |H| . Moreover, this holds even if the distinguisher is givenĝ −2i , which we will need to simulate the semi-functional ciphertext for x * . (On the other hand, given onlyĝ −2i , we cannot simulate semifunctional ciphertext for identities whose i'th bit is 0.) This means that
are computationally indistinguishable, even given the semi-functional ciphertext for x * . To achieve (*), we can then implicitly set:
This corresponds to Case 2 and Case 1 below respectively.
More generally, we guess at random the i'th bit of x * to be b i and use nested-hiding indistinguishability with index 2i − b i . In addition, we need to handle q keys and not just two keys, along with an additional complication arising from the fact that multiple queries may share the same i-bit prefix (see Case 3 below). 
and proceeds as follows:
Setup. Pick MSK ← R H, and output
.
Recall that we can sample a uniformly random element in ⟨h * ⟩ by raising h * to a uniformly random exponent in Z ord(H) . For all prefixes x ′ ∈ {0, 1} i−1 , we implicitly set
(We set R i (x ′ ∥b i ) later.) This means that for any x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) such that x i = b i , we have:
Key Queries. On input the j'th secret key query y = (y| i−1 , y i , . . . , y n ), we consider three cases: -Case 1:
and simply outputs where in the last equality, we use the fact that e(g 0 , R n (x * )) = 1 (see Remarks 1 and 5). In addition, MPK and all of the secret key queries reveal no information about R n (x * ). Then, by non-degeneracy, with probability 1 − 2 −Ω(λ) overĝ 0 , we have e(ĝ 0 , R n (x * )) is uniformly distributed over G T . This implies that the challenge ciphertext is identically distributed to a semi-functional encryption of a random message in G T , as in Game 3 . We may then conclude that: |Adv 2,n (λ) − Adv 3 (λ)| ≤ 2
−Ω(λ) . ⊓ ⊔ Remark 6. In our composite-order instantiation, we only have the weaker guarantee that e(ĝ 0 , R n (x * )) has at least 2λ bits of min-entropy, instead of being uniform over G T . We will modify the IBE scheme as follows: the message space is now {0, 1} λ , and we replace the term g λ is a pairwise independent hash function. By the left-over hash lemma, we still have |Adv 2,n (λ) − Adv 3 (λ)| ≤ 2
−Ω(λ) .
